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On Common Tastes
Heterogeneity and Hierarchies in Contemporary Cultural
Consumption
Birgit Eriksson
In both contemporary aesthetic theory and sociology of art there is a ten-
dency to conceive formation of taste not primarily as segmentation and 
status marker, but rather as connections and exchanges crossing tradi-
tional hierarchies. In this way they seem closer to a Kantian aesthetics 
than to Pierre Bourdieu’s social critique of the judgment of taste. The 
aim of this article is to examine this tendency. To do this I will briefly 
introduce first the idea of subjective universality as formulated by Kant, 
secondly the segmentation into different cultures of taste as described 
by Bourdieu, and thirdly some views on the function of taste in the con-
temporary context of globalization and aestheticization. More in depth I 
will discuss some recent sociological surveys which indicate an increas-
ing heterogeneity in contemporary cultural taste and consumption. These 
will be related to the theories of Kant and Bourdieu as well as the more 
recent views. Combining an aesthetic and a sociological perspective I will 
consider the social functions of taste and discuss the implications for so-
cial hierarchies and communities of a more heterogeneous consumption 
of culture. 
Subjective universality 
As a theoretical concept, taste achieved its modern meaning in the 18th 
century when it became important in the rise of modern aesthetics. In 
Kant’s The Critique of Judgement (Kritik der Urteilskraft, 1790) taste plays 
a crucial role in establishing a connection between individuality and hu-
manity. An aesthetic judgment (or judgment of taste) is a reflective judg-
ment of the beautiful, and the beautiful is something that causes disinter-
ested and universal pleasure. Reflective judgment is thus separated from 
more private judgments of what is pleasurable to one’s senses. Everyone 
has private sensual preferences, but in its general disinterestedness the 
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reflective judgment of taste expects a sensus communis and demands the 
agreement of others. When one claims something to be beautiful, “he 
judges not merely for himself, but for all men, and then speaks of beauty 
as if it were a property of things”.1 
On the other hand, aesthetic judgment is also different from logical 
judgments of reason. A judgment of taste does not follow a determin-
ing concept of beauty and has no general rule or principle to relate to. 
This is stressed by Kant’s famous words that “there may be contention 
about taste (although not a dispute)”.2 The validity of the judgment can-
not be decided objectively by proofs and concepts but only in actual social 
encounters. We cannot subsume the particular under a universal as in 
determinate judgment. But we proceed with our judgments as if it was 
possible to go from the particular to the universal – claiming “subjective 
universality”3 in the aesthetic relation.
This is what Kant calls the antinomy of the judgment of taste: that 
while, on the one hand, we presuppose that there is no objective correlate 
to the subjective judgment, on the other hand we invoke it exactly by 
expressing the judgment. In this way Kant creates a link between the in-
dividual and the universal. All it takes to make the link work is the general 
possibility of disinterestedness. Through disinterestedness it is possible 
to separate reflective taste from all the particular and inferior desires, cor-
poreal pleasures and so forth. 
Kant’s ideas were taken up and elaborated in various ways by Wil-
helm von Humboldt, Friedrich Schiller and others. In Humboldt’s theory 
of Bildung, the individual should realise both his own individuality and 
what is common to all mankind, giving “in our own person … the concept 
of humanity … as large a content as possible”.4 And Schiller elaborates 
on a parallel line of thought in his Letters upon the Aesthetic Education 
of Man (1794), criticising the consequences of the increasing differenti-
ation of the modern world, namely that man is “eternally chained down 
to a little fragment of the whole … instead of imprinting the seal of hu-
manity on his being”.5 
For both Humboldt and Schiller the solution for modern man was to 
turn to the aesthetic. While in other occupations man achieves specific 
abilities, only the aesthetic “play”, to use Schiller’s word, leads to the un-
limited and thereby to pure humanity. In the aesthetic condition we are 
all free and equal – released from individual particularities, dealing with 
what is common to everyone, and thereby belonging to a human commun-




Seen from the distance of more than 200 years, the early modern confi-
dence in aesthetic freedom from social interests seems more problematic. 
In the early modern period there were many good reasons to highlight 
what was common to everyone and to insist on the individual’s possibility 
to acquire and cultivate taste. These viewpoints had a democratic poten-
tial significantly stronger than the traditional understanding of good taste 
as the exclusive property of the aristocracy.6 However, the confidence in 
aesthetic equality did not make the social barriers disappear. Today Kant’s 
notion of subjective universality, Humboldt’s ideal of realising human-
ity in the individual and Schiller’s argument for an aesthetic short-cut to 
freedom and equality appear closely connected to the rise of the universal 
subject of bourgeois ideology. In this way, the early modern conception 
of universality was itself not universal, but bound to a historically and 
socially specific bourgeois way of relating the self and the world.7 
The critique of the bourgeois claim for universality emerged in the 
1950s and grew stronger and more explicit through the 60s and 70s. 
The originally British but now international tradition of Cultural Stud-
ies played an important role in this development. Focusing on working 
class culture, popular culture and more or less marginalised sub-cultures, 
it rejected the claims of more universal aesthetics. In the Cultural Studies 
tradition “culture is ordinary” – to invoke the title of a famous Raymond 
Williams essay – but taste is neither disinterested nor common to every-
one. On the contrary, the notion of disinterestedness has been replaced by 
analyses of various and complex interactions between culture and social 
interests, taste and power. Class, gender and ethnicity have become im-
portant prefixes to culture, and the elitist, aesthetic notion of culture is left 
behind in the effort to include the “whole way of life”.8
By analysing different cultures and relating taste to social interests, 
ideology and power, the Cultural Studies tradition detached itself from 
the basic aesthetic principles of disinterestedness and commonness. In a 
related line of thought, Pierre Bourdieu attacked the same principles from 
a philosophical as well as sociological point of view. In Distinction (La Dis-
tinction, 1979) – bearing the Kantian subtitle A Social Critique of the Judg-
ment of Taste – he opposed high aesthetics since Kant in two ways. Draw-
ing on an extensive, empirical survey of taste patterns in French society 
he demonstrated a homology between tastes in areas like art, food, drinks, 
indoor decorations, leisure activities, clothing, behaviour and friendships. 
By doing this he contested the division and hierarchy between pure, re-
flective pleasure and facile, sensuous agreeableness so dominant in mod-
On Common Tastes
39
ern aesthetics.9 Instead he treated aesthetic consumption as part of ordi-
nary consumption and argued that preferences in art as well as in dinner 
menus are not innocent but mark and reproduce class distinction. 
Bourdieu’s second point of critique thus regards the notion of subjective 
universality in the aesthetic judgment. According to him a disinterested 
aesthetic point of view is neither universal nor natural, but a distinctive 
ability appreciated and acquired by the dominant social class from early 
childhood. Moreover the aesthetic dispositions of the dominant group are 
not only different but made in opposition to the cultural goodwill of the 
middle class and the taste for necessity of the working class. In this way it 
marks a distinction, just as the taste of the middle class expresses distaste 
for the taste of the lowest status groups. Taste – and discourses about taste 
– therefore does not unite people in what is common to everyone. On the 
contrary it helps keeping the distance between the various social groups: 
“It functions as a sort of social orientation, a ‘sense of one’s place’.”10 
When taste is everywhere 
Bourdieu’s Distinction has been very influential both in demonstrating 
how cultural taste can be investigated and in going beyond the empirical 
data of the survey and theorising the links between taste, social status 
and class. It has made it significantly more difficult to support the early 
modern idea that by cultivating taste we are able to overcome the particu-
larities and divisions of modern life and approach what is common to all. 
On the other hand, this idea also seems hard to leave behind, and lately it 
seems to have had a revival – however, not on the basis of the enlighten-
ment and humanism of Kant and his contemporaries, but on the basis of 
a late modern globalization and aestheticization. 
In many ways the actual globalization and aestheticization make the 
question of taste’s ability to overcome cultural differences even more im-
portant than it was for Kant and Bourdieu. Globalization has increased 
both the connectivity of the world and our sense of the world as a whole 
and thereby made cultural diversity an important part of everyday life, 
the media and cultural theory.11 Aestheticization seems just as conspicu-
ous, in the staging of shopping experiences, the branding of companies, 
countries and universities, and the styling of cities, television programs, 
homes, kids and lives. Advanced aesthetic strategies and devices are ob-
viously used not only in the arts, but also in commercials, fashion and 
the design of the media we use to communicate and the world we live 
in. Reality appears increasingly as narrative, performative and all in all 
changeable, and there is talk of a general aesthetic turn.12 
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But what does this dissemination of (appeals to) aesthetic judgments 
mean for community in a global world of cultural differences? In a way 
the general aestheticization seems to confirm the ‘vulgar’ aspect of Bour-
dieu’s theory: his denial of a radical difference between high aesthetics 
and the lower sensual pleasures. But does the expansion of aesthetic judg-
ment thereby also democratize taste and level the symbolic hier archies? 
Or does it on the contrary make the aesthetic distinctions even more 
omnipresent than in Bourdieu’s analysis, confirming his statement that 
“Nothing is more distinctive, more distinguished, than the capacity to 
confer aesthetic status on objects that are banal or even ‘common’ …, or 
the ability to apply the principles of a ‘pure’ aesthetic to the most everyday 
choices of everyday life, e.g., in cooking, clothing or decoration”?13 This 
is being investigated in contemporary aesthetics, cultural analysis and 
sociology of art.
As if there is a community
In contemporary aesthetic theory the Kantian principles still play a cen-
tral role when arguing for the social relevance of the arts. An example is 
Danish aesthetic theorist Morten Kyndrup, who pays his debt to Kant, de-
scribing how aesthetic judgment generates a passage from the individual 
to the community, from ‘I’ to ‘we’. According to Kyndrup, the expansion 
of aesthetic judgment gives reason for optimism regarding our commun-
ities, but not because of any naïve confidence in a given sensus communis. 
Even more than Kant, Kyndrup emphasizes that judgment is set forth 
not because, but “as if” there is common sense able to firmly anchor it 
objectively.14 However, his optimistic point is that this “as if” works quite 
well –, 
the enunciation of the judgment creates a passage from ‘I’ to ‘we’, a connection 
between the isolation of a subjectivity thrown upon itself and the communi-
cating individual equally definitively thrown upon community, upon sociality. 
This passage is created in the single individual and simultaneously objectivizes 
the subjective and subjectivizes the objective.15
The idea of subjective universality is only an idea, but an extremely effec-
tual one. According to Kyndrup, it is of cardinal importance for modern 
processes of civilization and for sociality as such. Escaping, on the one 
hand, the despotism of radical objectivism and, on the other, the unpredict-
ability of radical subjectivism, it avoids the two extremes that would both 
lead to the end of argumentation and communication. Kyndrup therefore 
– although rather cautiously – regards contemporary aestheticization as a 
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positive quantitative and qualitative development of the subjective uni-
versality of the judgment of taste. By being neither purely objective nor 
purely subjective, aesthetic judgment is something that we can and do 
meet and communicate about. It is thus anything but turned away from 
the world and its communities. On the contrary, by enunciating an aes-
thetic judgment one “puts oneself and one’s own subjectivity in play by 
making it visible; one establishes an I/we-passage inside one’s own sub-
jectivity, this being in itself an appeal to and an approval of sociality”.16 
In other words, by appealing increasingly to judgments of taste, aes-
thetic iz ation can both challenge our identities and bring us together.
Sense of plurality
But what is the social potential of aesthetic judgment from the point of 
view of a cultural analyst? Turning to Wolfgang Welsch for an answer, 
one also gets a rather optimistic response. Unlike Kyndrup, Welsch bases 
his argument not on an appeal to community, but rather on aesthetic plu-
rality. In this plurality lies the potential to become more tolerant towards 
the differences of the world. In his argument he turns his attention not 
to early modern aesthetics, but towards high and postmodern aesthetics. 
Inspired mainly by Adorno’s Ästhetische Theorie and Negative Dialektik, 
he argues that the value of an aesthetic unity depends on the manifold it-
self. Contrary to political justice, it does not cause differences to disappear 
for the benefit of formal equivalence. An aesthetic unity has “the ideal of 
doing justice to the heterogeneous”.17 
While Adorno mainly focused on the heterogeneity inside the single 
work of art, Welsch emphasizes the heterogeneity between works of art, 
genres, traditions, modes of perception and reception. 20th century art 
obviously does not contain one artistic standard or canon, but a plurality 
of highly varying paradigms setting forth their own values and criteria. It 
makes no sense to judge pop art with criteria taken from expressionism or 
poems with criteria used for novels. Aesthetic judgment is – just as Kant 
argued – singular and concrete and cannot be based on a general rule. 
What art can provide is thus a sensibility towards differences. A thor-
oughly aestheticized culture would according to Welsch pay critical atten-
tion to borders, differences, exclusions and injustice, and not only regard-
ing artistic creations, but equally in everyday life and social relations.18 
This does not mean, however, that visiting a museum or reading a poem 
automatically turns us into better human beings. But a reflective aesthetic 
consciousness has a potential regarding sensibility which can indirectly 
become socially relevant: “What is made possible however, is a transfer 
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of aesthetic sensibility to social issues through a specific analogy between 
conditions in art and in life. Their common denominator is denoted by 
the watchword ‘plurality’.”19 If we use this possibility, if we transfer aes-
thetic sensibility to a social standard, we will become more attentive to 
the specific logics and rights of various life forms. And by this means 
aestheticization will indirectly contribute to a political culture where ac-
knowledgement and justice replace dominance and suppression. 
Tasting a bit of everything
The third answer to the question about the contemporary changes in the 
social functions of taste – and the one I will discuss more in detail – comes 
from research on ‘omnivore’ cultural consumption initiated in the 1990s 
by the American sociologist Richard A. Peterson. In various seminal writ-
ings Peterson and his colleagues pointed out significant changes in elitist 
taste.20 Comparing two empirical surveys of the musical taste of Americans 
from 1982 and 1992, respectively, Peterson and Roger M. Kern argued that 
people in high status occupations became increasingly omnivorous and 
were more omnivorous than lower status groups. Up through the 1980s 
and 90s there seemed to have been “a qualitative shift in the basis for mark-
ing elite status – from snobbish exclusion to omnivorous appropriation”.21 
While the snobs preferred highbrow culture and avoided both middle- and 
lowbrow activities, the omnivores were open towards appreci ating them 
all.22 Not only did they consume more highbrow culture than others, they 
were also more involved in a broad spectrum of low status activities. The 
omnivores did not necessarily like everything, but as Peterson and Kern 
wrote: “Perfect snobs are now rare in the United States.”23 
The finding of an increasing diversity of cultural consumption attracted 
much attention, and the notion of omnivore has spread in contempor-
ary sociology. Over the past decade there has thus been a multiplication 
of studies elaborating on Peterson’s research, and the hypothesis of a 
shift from elitist snobbishness to eclectic and omnivore inclusion has 
been qualified in numerous empirical surveys based on data from vari-
ous countries in North America, Canada and Europe.24 The methods and 
results vary but in general the sociologists agree that the diversity of taste 
is increasing, and cultural consumption is becoming more heterogeneous 
and unpredictable. 
One might object that this is old news and that Peterson and the other 
sociologists supply little else than empirical support to insights that have 
been common sense in the humanities ever since the theories of the post-
modern. Over the last decades there has been a general shift in sociologi-
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cal, cultural and aesthetic theory “towards conceptualising the self, cul-
ture, and society as multiple, fluid, and fragmented in contrast to a past 
pictured as unitary, stable, and coherent” (Ollivier: 121).
However, the sociologists transcend common sense and become rele-
vant to the argument of this article because they also discuss the relation-
ship between cultural taste and social life. They are not satisfied once they 
have demonstrated the increasing diversity of cultural consumption and 
the dissolution of fixed hierarchies. They also ask why. Is the spread of 
omnivorousness an indication of growing democratisation and tolerance 
in contemporary culture? Does cultural openness equate to social and pol-
itical openness? Or has omnivorousness just replaced participation in and 
knowledge of high culture as the predominant marker of distinction? 
Where is high, who is low, and why?
The above questions are hotly debated in contemporary cultural sociol-
ogy. So are of course the very notion of omnivorousness and the methods 
by which to measure it. For how do we distinguish when the division 
between art and popular culture has been attacked from both sides since 
the 1960s? How do we measure the diversity of cultural consumption 
if not only the boundaries between high and low culture, but the very 
concepts themselves have become problematic? While some sociologists 
ignore this difficulty, others openly confront “the lack of objective cri-
teria to determine what constitutes high, legitimate or elite forms in the 
contemporary context”.25 Some sociologists solve the problem by turning 
from quantitative data to qualitative interviews, thereby being able to in-
vestigate the reasons for and meaning of omnivorousness, the “manner of 
appropriation” instead of just “the matter that is appropriated”.26
Regarding the reasons for omnivorousness, the interpretations have 
had both optimistic and more sceptical notes. In “Changing Highbrow 
Taste: From Snob to Omnivore”, Peterson and Kern offered the following 
five explanations for the development they had observed empirically: (1) 
social mobility and the mass media increase familiarity with the taste of 
others; (2) youth culture is not necessarily considered a stage to go through 
but a viable alternative for adults as well; (3) the art world itself has experi-
enced a change from fixed standards (cf. Welsch) to multiple evaluations 
and appropriations; (4) there is a general trend towards greater tolerance 
of people with different values; (5) omnivorous inclusion seems to fit an 
increasingly global world managed by those who make their way by in-
corporating and showing respect for the culture of others.27 
With this argument that common (American) culture is becoming 
Birgit Eriksson
44
more tolerant towards the taste and values of others and consequently 
less oppressive and hierarchical, Peterson and Kern might at first sight 
seem to contest the validity of Bourdieu’s theory of taste as a distinction 
and status marker. That fixed hierarchies dissolve and elitist culture of 
taste opens up towards what was previously excluded, does not, however, 
necessarily mean that status hierarchies disappear. It might not be the 
function but only the criteria of taste as a status marker that has changed: 
high status is no longer based on familiarity with a specific elitist canon of 
art works and lifestyles but ”gained by knowing about and participating 
in (that is to say consuming) all forms”.28 
This interpretation is confirmed in the most recent research on Ameri-
can culture. In the anthology Engaging Art: The Next Great Transformation 
of America’s Cultural Life from 2008 it is thus a common premise that the 
position of high culture arts as cultural capital is declining. One reason for 
this is that “commercial popular culture has become so pervasive and so 
finely segmented (as nichecasting has replaced broadcasting in fields as 
diverse as fiction publishing, cable television, the music industry, and film) 
as to overwhelm the ability of universities and nonprofit cultural institu-
tions to maintain their cultural centrality”.29 The development of the media 
and the internet has highly augmented the abundance, rate and variety 
of cultural information and aesthetic artefacts, thereby making it much 
more common to engage with the arts via the media than by attending live 
performances or visiting museums.30 And as some surveys suggest, the 
in creasingly private access to cultural products favours popular culture.31 
Finally the variety and mixing of genres is also reinforced by the univer-
sities and the art world themselves. In the art world the criterion of a single 
standard as well as firm boundaries between high and popular culture are 
long dead, just as the universities for many years have studied both. 
Identifying oneself with a specific cultural and aesthetic regime is thus 
regarded an indication of a limited horizon and understanding. Today, om-
nivorousness is a normative standard for good taste, and openness to the 
taste of others is socially valued by both omnivores and others: “middle-
class respondents in the 1950s knew it was conventional to report an 
exclusive involvement with the traditional high arts … Correspondingly, 
respondents today know that it is more fashionable to express an involve-
ment with a much wider range of cultural forms”.32 
This means that the notion of omnivorousness has changed. It is not 
as closely associated with the social elite and highbrow cultural forms as 
it was in the 90s, but a much more general phenomenon. A recent survey 
thus shows that there is a strong statistical frequency of omnivores or 
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‘dissonant profiles’ within all the major social groups, all levels of educa-
tion and every category of age – although much more likely for those with 
high social position, with long education and the younger generations, 
than amongst those with lower social position, lower level of education 
and older age, respectively.33 There is a more consonant profile “‘at the 
bottom’ (i.e. in terms of the least legitimate cultural activities) than at the 
‘top’”.34 Many surveys result in similar conclusions: that it is very common 
to combine various cultural registers (high-/middle-/lowbrow, classical/
avantgarde/pop) – but also that it is much more common for high status 
people to embrace the popular arts than for working class people to em-
brace the fine arts.35 
An explanation of this, which would be in line with Bourdieu’s theory 
of social taste hierarchies, is that the former elitist omnivorousness has 
now diffused out into lower status levels of the population. Omnivorous-
ness has become “an increasingly common measure of high status over 
the second half of the 20th century in North America, Europe and beyond, 
and just like the criterion of high-status snobbery before it, it will event-
ually pass”.36 In fact Peterson’s most recent survey from 2002 may already 
signal the coming of a post-omnivore period but this is not confirmed 
by other surveys and may according to Peterson himself be a (partly) er-
roneous finding.37
A new sense of necessity?
Another reason could be that the open-minded flexibility of the omnivore 
is not only high status but a necessary social and professional compe-
tence. Elaborating on Gerhard Schulze’s theory of lifestyle milieus in Die 
Erlebnisgesellschaft (1992) and Simon Frith’s differentiation of musical 
discourses, Koen van Eijck has identified the cultural omnivore with the 
new middle class.38 The emergence of the cultural omnivore reflects moral 
qualities highly appreciated and rewarded in our still more rapidly chang-
ing society. This holds good especially of the ability and will to keep our 
possibilities open and adjust to new phenomena and requirements – skills 
more and more in demand in a labour market characterized by flexibility 
and dynamic changes. As Richard Sennett writes in the The Corrosion 
of Character: The Personal Consequences of Work in the New Capitalism: 
“The emphasis is on flexibility. Rigid forms of bureaucracy are under at-
tack, as are the evils of blind routine. Workers are asked to behave nimbly, 
to be open to change on short notice, to take risks continually, to become 
ever less dependent on regulations and formal procedures.”39
These requirements of contemporary management practice seem to be 
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reflected in cultural consumption. Mobility and networking in strongly 
differentiated societies require and generate omnivorousness. Through 
their openness and flexibility the omnivores represent a profile most like-
ly to achieve professional success in ‘the new capitalism’. They are able to 
comprehend situations that do not correspond to their prior experience, 
and to internalize heterogeneous socializing influences. Seen from this 
perspective, the new omnivores are not primarily characterized by their 
inclination towards cultural multiplicity, but rather by submitting to the 
social and economic requirements of flexibility, mobility, employability 
and networking. They adapt to the new conditions, internalize a plurality 
of the cultural offering as well as a plurality of social groups,40 can appro-
priate and enjoy almost everything, and are thus able to express “a range 
of quite different tastes as the circumstances demand”.41 
If this is true, it might be useful to reconsider Bourdieu’s theory of 
homo logy between personal values and qualities, cultural consumption 
and position in the labour market. With the concept of homology he turns 
the attention from production to consumption and thereby anticipates 
more recent theories of experience economy. According to Bourdieu, the 
new economy demands a change of ethics:
The new logic of the economy rejects the ascetic ethic of production and accu-
mulation … in favour of a hedonistic morality of consumption, based on credit, 
spending and enjoyment. This economy demands a social world which judges 
people by their capacity for consumption, their ‘standard of living’, their life-
style as much as by their capacity for production. … [T]he new taste-makers 
propose a morality which boils down to an art of consuming, spending and 
enjoying.42
This “capacity for consumption” is exactly what the new flexible omniv ores 
possess. But it is also something that they have to possess. And in the years 
that have passed since Bourdieu’s Distinction from 1979 the necessity of 
this capacity seems to have spread from a rather exclusive new bourgeoisie 
to a much larger middle class. 
Hierarchies and communities
The question remains of what heterogeneous and unpredictable cultural 
consumption does to our communities. If the general ability to consume 
and enjoy a broad variety of aesthetic artefacts increases, does this also 
mean that we – quantitatively as well as qualitatively – become more 
inclined to follow what Kant defined as the maxim of the judgment of 
taste: the “enlarged thought”,43 where we put ourselves in the position of 
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everyone else? And in so doing do we satisfy the claims to universality of 
early modern aesthetics, as well as those of Kyndrup’s ‘I’-‘we’ passage and 
Welsch’s acknowledgement of plurality?
The answer seems to be negative, at least regarding Kant, Humboldt 
and Schiller. Their confidence in the social potential of the aesthetic pre-
supposes a rather exclusive judgment of taste. For them it is of crucial im-
portance to keep distance to the vulgar sensual pleasures and in general 
to exclude all individual and social interests. Kant’s description of how 
we are to put ourselves in the position of everyone else does not imply 
adopting the actual particular standpoints of others, but comparing one’s 
judgment with “the merely possible judgments of others … as the result 
of a mere abstraction from the limitations which contingently affect our 
own estimate”.44 The social potential is placed in an intellectualized and 
transcendental judgment of taste and excludes a good deal of contem-
porary cultural consumption.
To Kyndrup and Welsch, things look a little different. In accordance 
with the general tendencies in contemporary theory, they both acknowl-
edge the presence and importance of the particular and also distance 
themselves from the traditional exclusion of vulgar sensuality. However, 
the hierarchies seem to reappear when Welsch distinguishes between a 
“surface” and a “deep-seated aesthetization”, and when he stresses that it is 
not ”the enjoyment of art as such, but only a reflected aesthetic conscious-
ness according to today’s conditions that affords the potential for sensi-
bility which can also become socially relevant”.45 A similar ambivalence 
is present in Kyndrup’s theory. He avoids the traditional hierarchy of the 
sensuous by explaining how aesthetic relationships can be established 
with all kinds of objects and situations in everyday life. But, at the same 
time, he finds it “obvious that not all evaluations of something, not all idio-
syncrasies or preferences constitute judgments of taste”.46 They require 
the ability to “see oneself see”. Also in these late modern versions of aes-
thetic and cultural theory there is thus a tendency to situate the potential 
for an acknowledging or exchanging community in analytical, articulate 
and reflective minds rather than in inarticulate and sensuous bodies.
In the theory of the omnivore it seems to be the other way around. 
What is important in the notion of the omnivore is not intellectual reflec-
tion but rather consumption and enjoyment. Taking the metaphor seri-
ously, the omnivore seems to indicate another form of material and bodily 
appropriation. The omnivore can easily consume cultural artefacts with-
out reflecting on or talking about them – like some survey respondents 
who indiscriminately say that they e.g. “like all music”.
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But maybe omnivorousness is the wrong metaphor, or a metaphor 
that only fits part of what is going on. Many surveys point at a much 
more selective “picky omnivore” that differs from the traditional snobs 
not as much in degree of selectiveness as in preference for innovative 
experiments and hybrids instead of perfection in well-defined genres.47 
The openness of the omnivores is often partial and qualified. They accept 
many things but “dislike particular items in particular ways”, and their 
omnivorous orientation “is itself a way of negotiating and demonstrating 
a form of distinction”.48 
It is therefore also problematic, as some sociologists do, to associate 
aesthetic omnivorousness with a more general openness towards cultural 
and social diversity, “spontaneously drawing up a flattering portrait of the 
new elites as being more tolerant, more eclectic, less sectarian (we might 
say “culturally cosmopolitan”) than the popular classes who are labelled 
more constrained, less tolerant, and less open”.49 
But this tendency among sociologists – as well as among aesthetic and 
cultural theorists who believe that art has a social and humanistic potential 
of challenging our own beliefs, opening up towards other experiences and 
communities, and doing justice to the heterogeneous – is also problematic 
in other ways. One is that it is far from obvious that disliking certain cul-
tural genres necessarily indicates intolerance. Disliking something is sure 
possible without questioning the rights of others to like it.50 Another is 
more complicated. It regards the manner of consumption. For how do we 
know if the various artefacts are consumed with the sensible minds and 
reflected eyes described by Kyndrup and Welsch, or if, on the other hand, 
they are consumed as commodities, as objects made for consumption, 
with all the required homogenization, accessibility and exchangeability? 
Our swift everyday alternation between pasta and sushi or between Ar-
gentinean tango and hip hop clearly shows that our consumption does 
not necessarily imply a deeper cultural knowledge or acknowledgement. 
Instead of being seen as expressions of a more fundamental otherness, of 
other ways of understanding the world, of other cultures or other forms 
of life, the artefacts may just as well be judged according to an immediate 
domestication and appropriation. Understood in this way, the omnivores 
who find expressions of all sorts from around the world open to aesthetic 
appropriation give a false impression of the ease by which cultural differ-
ences are overcome.51 
What is clear, however, is that the hierarchies have not disappeared. 
When the picky omnivores include popular culture instead of avoiding 
it, they thereby elevate themselves by showing that they can look beyond 
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their own niches and understand this too. This is especially relevant as 
cultural niche-casting and niche-marketing is increasing, thereby dividing 
audiences, citizens and consumers into ever more narrowly defined 
groups and presenting them only with information and products they are 
likely to want.52 In some ways this contradicts the demand of flexibility, 
openness etc. described above. But it is rather the flip side of the coin. It is 
because and not in spite of cultural diversity and different lifestyle niches 
that it is high status to be able to transgress your own limited milieu. This 
is cultural capital, defined in another way than Bourdieu did it 30 years 
ago, but with a similar hierarchy. 
At the top is the ideal type of the picky omnivores who have the knowl-
edge and ability to judge everything aesthetically. They pick and choose 
from the cultural abundance, finding what is interesting and using it in 
a creative way. They know and dare enough to sort out, challenge estab-
lished hierarchies and make aesthetic judgments. This is an ideal type no 
longer relying on the prescriptions, concepts and rules of Kant’s determi-
nate judgment. It is a character able – just as Kant described the judgment 
of taste – to act without given rules and maybe even produce new ones. In 
the middle are the flexible and more indiscriminating omnivores who out 
of necessity and/or goodwill internalize the requirements of the new capi-
talism. They have the capacity for consumption, and adapt and appropri-
ate as the circumstances demand. Finally, at the bottom, are the univores, 
unable to profit from the cultural abundance and unable to leave their 
own cultural and social niche. 
The hierarchies have not disappeared in cultural life, and neither have 
they disappeared in the contemporary debates about taste and cultural 
consumption. The elite way of appropriating arts and culture is once 
again portrayed as the most elevated – just as it has been for the last 
couple of hundred years in the aesthetic tradition following Kant. What 
has changed is probably that it now requires even more time and cultural 
capital, than it did when Bourdieu wrote his social critique, to acquire the 
elite way of appropriation. In other words the fact that the hierarchies are 
less firmly defined does in no way mean that they are less strong. 
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